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This policy brief summarizes a report presented at the 9th Research Partnership Platform
(RPP) meeting during the annual United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) events between 9 and 13 July, 2018. The research is being conducted as part of
the Oxford University Consumer Rights Beyond Boundaries programme in the Oxford Law
Faculty. It is an ongoing project supported by UNCTAD. We welcome comments and
suggestions; please contact hui.xue@sydney.edu.au or alex.chung@ucl.ac.uk.
This policy brief aims to address the following issues: 
n Clarify the terms ‘sharing economy’ and ‘platform economy’ from a regulatory
perspective;
n Highlight the regulatory challenges arising from the conflicting interests of
governments, corporations, labour, and consumers, and to situate this within the UK’s
actively regulated digital economy as compared to China’s digital market, which is
currently the largest in the world;
n Identify the most contested regulatory areas as illustrated through the case studies of
Uber in the UK and Didi in China, ranging from consumer protection to labour and
employment, and from competition to data protection;
n Sketch a landscape of cross-sectoral complexities related to the many services that a
single given technology-enabled service provider can provide, with a focus on the
lacklustre manner with which existing or newly proposed laws and policies are being
implemented;
n Provide evidence for the above based on case studies from various corporate services
across geographic regions.
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Introduction
The sharing economy poses tremendous challenges
for regulators in a wide array of sectors, such as
transportation, employment, consumer protection,
and digital economy. It is of particular concern for
those responsible for the regulation of transportation,
since it gives rise to a host of new challenges that
endanger public safety, such as threats to the jobs of
traditional operators, and the unfair use of consumers’
personal data. The rapid expansion and diversification
of the sharing economy’s transportation sector
requires carefully crafted measures that can be
implemented by existing regulatory bodies or by new
and alternative forms of regulators. Here, our analysis
focuses on the most problematic transportation
sector — namely, the ride-hailing and sharing online
platforms Uber and Didi Chuxing (Didi hereafter) —
from a comparative perspective. 
In the digital society, policymakers and regulators are
often faced with the challenge of having to identify
where exactly the regulatory space is, which party
should assume liability and on what ground, and
which law should thus apply. With regards to the issue
of regulatory space, a primary reason for the obscurity
it creates is the complexity generated by the
conflicting interests of governments, corporations,
and consumers. The ever-expanding information
asymmetry makes the balancing of interests more and
more difficult between government departments,
multinational corporates and their business partners,
and vulnerable consumers. Yet, these concerns only
capture the attention of regulators when problems
become so severe that they lead to adverse
consequences — which our case studies will show.
The preliminary findings from our research highlight
the main regulatory issues and shed light on
emerging regulatory and governance models.
The peer-to-peer nature of the sharing
economy and the platform economy 
The term ‘sharing economy’, to begin with, is not
helpful for regulators because it does not capture
the essence of the contemporary economy which
many societies had not experienced until recently.
The early scholarly debate on the terminology
includes communal consumption, and later,
collaborative consumption (Hamari et al. 2016). Both
of these mainly refer to peer-to-peer assistance
rather than single-sided platforms in the
marketplace that share goods and services or enable
transactions through community-based online
services. But the term has become readily accepted
by the public due to its association with services like
Uber and Didi, making it a common household term.
Further confounding this concept are the specific
activities related to this term, which encompass four
broad categories: 1) recirculation of goods, 2)
increased utilization of idle assets, 3) exchange of
services, 4) sharing of productive assets (Schor 2014). 
Some research further suggests categorizing the
sharing economy into two distinct groups: ‘labour
platforms’ and ‘capital platforms’.1 The former serves
to allocate labour resources to allow freelance or
contingent workers to interact with consumers to
complete tasks or projects; the latter facilitates
individuals to share their goods or properties for
financial gain.2 Uber and Didi fall under the first
category. 
Similarly, ‘platform economy’ is a problematic term
due to the multiple infrastructural dimensions it
embodies. For the regulator, there are at least three
dimensions to consider when implementing rules:
technological infrastructure which facilitates
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information transmission and distribution between
different service providers, consumers, drivers, and
other participants; economic infrastructure that
enables logistic resources or finances to be
transacted in a certain way, and thus develop
sustainable business models; and cultural
infrastructure which refers to different stakeholders
or actors who may or may not share economic
interests but which generate cultural and social
norms in the course of the communal exchange and
interaction. When examining any given type of
sharing economy or platform economy from these
perspectives, it helps to consider three questions
that are central concerns for the regulator: Who is
involved?; in what way are resources allocated and
redistributed?; and which law and policies apply
under a certain set of circumstances?
Regulatory issues: Uber in the UK and Didi in
China  
Although they operate within two very different
markets and regulatory systems, cases involving
serious crimes of assault, murder, and rape have
plagued both Uber and Didi over the past few years.
For instance, there have been fourteen separate
cases in which female passengers have been sexually
assaulted by Didi drivers in China (Tsoi 2018); Uber is
also facing a class action lawsuit from nine women in
the US (O’Brien 2018). Activists have created
websites to protest and expose the dark side of an
under-regulated Uber operating environment that
leads to consumer protection and public safety
concerns, as well as precarious working conditions
that are tantamount to exploitation of the drivers.
Furthermore, using data for operational purposes
has potential consequences for digital justice and
fairness in the long term. 
In the following two cases, our discussion explores
three issues:
n Roles of the service provider and the consumer;
n Main regulatory issues these two cases have in
common; 
n Principles for emerging regulatory and
governance models according to the characters
of each service.
Uber in the British regulatory environment
The UK government’s stated ambition is to make the
UK the ‘global centre for the sharing economy’ (DBIS
2014). But at what cost, one might ask? Numerous
mass protests have been staged in London by non-
Uber cab drivers accusing Uber of abusing their
market dominance, which has dramatically driven
the price downwards as the number of available
drivers has increased. Aside from Uber’s anti-
competitive practices, they are also known for a
general lack of due care of the precarious working
conditions of its drivers. In addition, there are
numerous recent examples of serious physical
assault perpetrated against both taxi drivers and
consumers.
When Uber was first launched in the UK, black cabs
pressured Transport for London to take Uber to court
over their alleged illegal use of the Uber app, which
they considered to be the equivalent of a taximeter.
Although the court ruled in Uber’s favour, there were
other complaints from the industry about Uber’s
business practice and unfair treatment of drivers.
These include conditions of employment that lead to
job uncertainty, insecurity, and general
precariousness, mainly through the power
asymmetry that allows Uber to exercise control over
pricing, how drivers should work, and how the
service should be run.
Two of the drivers, James Farrar and Yaseen Aslam,
took Uber to court in 2016 in a bid to become
recognized as Uber employees or workers under UK
employment law, rather than as independent
contractors or self-employed (Aslam and Others v
Uber BV and Others). The court decided that they
should be characterized as workers. This meant that
Uber drivers can receive some but not all of the
benefits and job security of regular employees. In its
justification, the court has generally rejected Uber’s
use of multiple corporate personalities to circumvent
the relevant UK employment and competition laws
(OPBP 2017: 6). 
A licence ban to prevent Uber from operating in
London resulted from this court decision in 2016, but
Uber was allowed to keep operating while it
appealed the decision. In June 2018, a London court
granted a contrite Uber a temporary fifteen-month
licence. This was granted under a clear set of
conditions which the Transport for London
authorities will closely monitor and enforce (Smout
2018). Uber agreed to take on more corporate
responsibility in the soft form of voluntary and self-
regulation. For instance, Uber has implemented a
twenty-four-hour customer complaints hotline,
direct crime reporting to the police, mandatory work
breaks, and more stringent rules for drivers’
backgrounds and medical checks.
A collaborative way of implementing regulations
sometimes results from an effort to reach common
ground between platforms and regulators, as the UK
example shows. Although the authorities have now
finally decided to take a harder regulatory stance
against Uber, it too often occurs only after great
costs have been incurred — both in terms of the
financial cost of legal battles and harm to the society
at large. 
These are not issues that can be quickly or easily
resolved by regulators and the courts alone. Not
least, this is due to the disruptive nature of the
innovative technologies that test and stretch legal
and regulatory boundaries. Uber’s business model
renders many of the traditional rules and laws
inapplicable to the services they provide. Some of
these services inherently raise concerns relating to
consumer protection and public safety. Yet, the very
idea of whether to regulate them has been met with
reluctance from government and industry, due to
the apparent benefits offered to consumers and
concerns about stifling innovation. Further, as most
of the cases against Uber are settled via private
arbitration before reaching the courts, they avoid
public scrutiny, which would otherwise prompt calls
for new regulations. 
More needs to be done to create clear definitions for
the sharing economy and reduce legal grey areas.
Best practice needs to be considered on a case-by-
case basis rather than a one-size-fits-all regulatory
approach, depending on the service in question. This
is especially important given the rapid expansion
and diversification of the transportation sector,
which is further demonstrated in the following case
of Didi in China. 
Didi in the Chinese regulatory environment 
To maintain an advantageous position in the
competitive technological world, these ride-hailing
service providers are racing to harvest bigger sets of
data. Extensive analysis of data through machine-
learning improves demand and supply to multiple
parties, and precisely predicts the online and offline
activities of consumers and drivers, potential
commercial opportunities, and profitable future
business models. 
In the case of Didi, we examine the above from the
perspective of data protection for individual
consumers. The following analysis explains how data
harvesting changes the market structure, current
regulatory issues, and possible regulatory
implications for protecting consumer data in the
business world, where power imbalances are
increasing.
In China, the sharing economy has grown
dramatically in recent years, where the amount of
financing has reached US $32.54 billion in 2017 (NIC
2018: 1). With a growing population that leads to
high competition for resources, the transportation
sector contributed most, in proportion to the non-
financing category of the sharing economy; Didi
ranks first in this sector. It has become the largest
ride-hailing market in the world, with over 14 million
private drivers and 300 million active users as of
summer 2016 (Sundararajan 2016). By comparison,
Uber has 50 million registered passengers (NIC
2017). Didi achieved this through fierce competition
in Mainland China, including its purchasing of Uber
in 2016 (Newcomer and Wang 2016). 
Didi became the first large mobile app-based
transportation service provider in China after the
merger of Didi dache and Kuaidi dache in 2015 (Shih
2015). Chinese internet giants Tencent and Alibaba
provided investment backing for them. Didi further
attracted international investors, including SoftBank
of Japan, amounting to $4 billion in 2017, to boost
its competitive advantage in artificial intelligence
(AI) and new technologies (SoftBank 2017). Its
globalization has accelerated as a result of its
investment in South East Asia, Australia, Mexico, and
Brazil (Zhu and Wu 2018). The overseas market
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expansion is preparing for a viable data platform to
record registered users’ profiles, travel routines,
payments, and other online and offline activities,
which would help Didi to utilize data and AI to
further build digital infrastructures for smart and
green cities (Ge et al. 2017).
The introduction of venture capitalists into this space
has changed the dynamics of sharing enterprises
(Schor 2014). Its services have developed alongside
market expansion, from ride-hailing services to
mobility solutions providers, and most recently as a
travel-oriented all-in-one platform. However, in
attempting to use data obtained from a global
platform, Didi now has to cautiously manage trust-
building with three key stakeholders: governments,
drivers, and consumers. 
In response to these changes, regulations have
evolved accordingly, from the regulators struggling
to understand the new services facilitated by
digital technologies operating in a state of non-
regulation in 2013, to a fragmented regulatory
landscape in 2016 that partially addresses relations
and trust-building between the three primary
stakeholders. Since the national regulation Interim
Measures for the Administration of Online Taxi
Booking Business Operations and Services was
enacted on 1 November 2016 (MIIT 2016), forty-
two cities across China have adopted this
regulation and adapted it in accordance with their
own local administrative rules (MOT 2017).
However, the fragmented nature of these disparate
administrative rules means that some of the more
prominent issues raised by different Didi services
remain hard to resolve.
In a recent case, a flight attendant was murdered
while using Didi Hitch services (Jiang 2018). The
incident generated a heated debate on social media,
temporarily halted the services, and led to more
stringent self-regulation rules concerning identity
checks of the drivers, based on the comments and
profiles of passengers and drivers.
There is a regulatory dilemma regarding the legal
status of Didi in this case: Didi claims its Hitch
services arm should not be regulated as a traditional
transport service but only as a contract-based trade.
According to Didi, its Hitch service is a voluntary one
that provides information for both drivers and
passengers to facilitate the matching of their needs
(e.g., road travel towards the same destination) and
the sharing of costs between passengers. Didi claims
that its intention to promote this voluntary service is
to reduce congestion. According to Didi’s user
agreement, if any accidents or incidents occur during
the ride, drivers are obliged to take full responsibility
for any harm sustained by passengers; Didi itself,
however, is exempt from any joint liability.3
Some scholars argue that although the act of
providing the platform does not imply an
employment relationship, the platform itself should
still assume joint liability, even if it is only an
intermediary. This argument makes sense in the case
at hand because Didi’s business growth is dependent
on passengers’ trust in the platform rather than on
in-kind exchange, as Didi proclaims. Didi aims to
incorporate a technological design that promotes
interaction through their proprietary social media
feature. This tool helps to increase both the loyalty of
their active users and their rider clientele base. The
case of Didi Hitch shows that, without mechanisms
to ensure the fair use of passenger profiles and
comments, user data may be subject to abuse. Such
abuse would undermine consumer trust as well as
government trust.
Figure 1 (overleaf ) shows one approach of co-
regulation that intends to ensure that the bona fides
of drivers and passengers are verified during each
ride. When users order ride services online, Didi
regulates information to match the needs between
drivers and passengers and handles riding
complaints on its operating platform. This process,
particularly with regard to the verification of the
driver’s identity, is completed in conjunction with
the regulator platforms. Didi’s regulatory platform
facilitates the collaboration of several primary
departments, such as police forces, tax offices,
telecommunication suppliers, and finance agencies
— including mobile payment suppliers — to share
data and ensure safe riding. 
Regulatory implications for emerging
regulatory and governance models
In modern society, regulators face the dilemma of
having to decide whether to apply existing law and
policy to emerging issues or to propose new rules
for particular regulatory purposes according to the
sector’s needs. The former might not easily apply to
new issues created by technology-enabled services,
while the latter might create new grey areas and
barriers that stifle innovation. The above two cases
reveal that most of the existing law and policies can
be adapted to function in a way that is fit for
purpose, but it does require extra due care on the
part of the regulator to discern the nature of the
services and joint liability in question for all parties
involved. There are no easy solutions, as regulators
will need to constantly play catch-up, given the ever
evolving nature of the sharing economy.
Nevertheless, the above cases show the need for
further empirical investigation and comprehensive
study into several research gaps that require
immediate attention.
These areas include the need to understand whether
current rules and laws may be overstretched in their
application to the sharing economy, or whether it
would be more appropriate to create new, tailored
rules for particular regulatory purposes according to
the sector’s needs. Operational guidelines to
implement key definitions in a variety of services will
help platforms improve their daily services and
reduce uncertainty at an early stage. 
Other questions that need to be explored include
the following: how do the above distinctions apply
to variations of the platform and technology that
involve similar types of service within the sector in
question or across sectors? What factors should be
considered in determining which type of laws and
regulations ought to be applied? As the above case
of Didi Hitch illustrates, in this service, Didi takes a
primary role as information intermediary. Therefore,
when a rape or murder is committed during the
service, the joint liability of Didi would shift the focus
of the investigation to the verification process for
driver eligibility and driver and vehicle registration.
By contrast, in other services like Didi’s ride-hailing
(as opposed to Didi’s voluntary service), its joint
liability might be different. The same applies to Uber. 
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Figure 1: One example of a hybrid of regulatory models
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on sources referenced in the text (MIIT 2016; MOT 2017).
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Moreover, with regard to data governance,
regulators need to clarify whether service providers
should be subject to joint liability in the case of data
breach, data misuse, data verification, data
standardization, and data sharing with business
partners, including internet service providers and
mobile payment suppliers. For example, questions
such as whether the platform should bear joint
liability if the passenger’s life is at risk due to
inaccuracy of driver identity information, or even
due to failure to identify a fraudulent driver’s licence,
need to be addressed.
Finally, data sharing between governmental
regulators and service providers in the name of the
public good may undermine data justice and do a
disservice to the public interest. Didi’s sharing of
data with government departments blurs the line in
that in doing so, it is arguably assuming a quasi-
regulatory role, thereby subrogating government
institutions. This could have negative implications for
consumer protection, given that an effective and
functioning online dispute platform has yet to be
established. Monopoly service providers may also
apply algorithms that not only lead to the
manipulation of information through unfair pricing
for consumers, but also the manipulation of
information to avoid stringent regulation imposed
by the government. Therefore, data sharing between
monopoly service providers with external business
partners may lead to unfair competition, as it could
increase entry barriers for newcomers with no access
to data where that access is exclusively the preserve
of the big players. Relatedly, data sharing between
the same monopoly service providers and public
sectors may cause concern for start-ups that have
less means to access the public administrative
system.
Notes
1 See further explanations on this distinction by Farrell & Ereig in Elizabeth J. Kennedy, ‘Employed by an Algorithm: Labor Right in the On-Demand
Economy’, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 987, 992 (2017); or FTC, ‘The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regulators A Federal
Trade Commission Workshop’, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-examine-competition-consumer-protection-
economic-issues-raised-sharing-economy-june-workshop/150416economyworkshop.pdf; or FTC, ‘The “Sharing” Economy Issues Facing
Platforms, Participants & Regulators: An FTC Staff Report’, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-
platforms-participants-regulators-federal-trade-commission-staff/p151200_ftc_staff_report_on_the_sharing_economy.pdf
2 Given the space constraints of this policy brief, we limit our discussion on the wider sharing economy and focus instead on its transportation
sector. We provide a more extensive discussion in our chapter which is due to appear in a joint-authored book, Law and the Digital Society
(forthcoming). For more information, please contact the corresponding author: hui.xue@sydney.edu.au.
3 See further explanations of the joint liability by Xiaojukeji, http://static.xiaojukeji.com/didialift/hybrid/pages/protocol/Carpool.html. Xiaojukeji
(Xiaoju Technology) is operating the platform that provides information services on behalf of Didi. 
8 . LEGAL AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF THE SHARING ECONOMY
References
Aslam and Others v Uber BV and Others. Case no: 2202550/2015, Judgment of 28 October 2016, 
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/aslam-and-farrar-v-uber-reasons-20161028.pdf
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (DBIS, 2014) ‘Move to make UK global centre for sharing economy’, UK Government Press Release,
29 September, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/move-to-make-uk-global-centre-for-sharing-economy
Ge, Y.M. et al. (2017) ‘Smart transportation in China and the United States’, Centre for Technology Innovation at Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/smart-transportation_final.pdf
Hamari, J. et al. (2016) ‘The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collaborative Consumption’, Journal of the Association for Information
Science and Technology 67(9): 2047–59, https://people.uta.fi/~kljuham/2016-hamari_at_al-the_sharing_economy.pdf
Jiang, N. (2018) ‘Disclosure of the owner of the crime’ [original in Chinese 滴滴出行车主犯罪情况披露], China Court, 14 May,
http://bjhdfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=5404
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT, 2016) ‘Interim Measures for the Administration of Online Taxi Booking Business
Operations and Services’, English translation available at http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=22963&lib=law, [originally in Chinese 
《网络预约出租汽车经营服务管理暂行办法》], http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1146557/n1146624/c5218603/content.html
Ministry of Transport of the People’s Republic of China (MOT, 2017) ‘42 Cities have issued regulations for the implementation of ride-hailing
services’ [originally in Chinese 42个城市已发布网约车实施细则], http://www.mot.gov.cn/jiaotongyaowen/201701/t20170102_2148616.html
National Information Centre (NIC, 2017) The Annual Report of Chinese Sharing Economy (2017) [originally in Chinese: 中国分享经济年度报告],
http://www.sic.gov.cn/archiver/SIC/UpFile/Files/Htmleditor/201703/20170302125144221.pdf
National Information Centre (NIC, 2018) The Annual Report of Chinese Sharing Economy (2018) [originally in Chinese: 中国分享经济年度报告],
http://www.sic.gov.cn/archiver/SIC/UpFile/Files/Default/20180320144901006637.pdf
Newcomer, E. and Wang, S. (2016) ‘In Deal with Didi, Uber Frees Itself to Expand in Other Markets’, Bloomberg, 1 August,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-01/uber-said-to-merge-china-business-with-didi-in-35-billion-deal
Oxford Pro Bono Publico (OPBP, 2017) ‘The Employment Status of Uber Drivers: A Comparative Report Prepared for the Social Law Project,
University of the Western Cape’, OPBP Report, October; led by Professor Sandra Fredman, University of Oxford.
O’Brien, S. A. (2018) ‘9 women who allege assaults by Uber drivers want the right to unite in court’, CNN Tech, 30 May, 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/30/technology/uber-proposed-class-action-driver-abuse/index.html
Schor, J. (2014) ‘Debating the Sharing Economy’, Great Transition Initiative (October 2014), http://www.msaudcolumbia.org/summer/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Schor_Debating_the_Sharing_Economy.pdf
Shih, G. (2015) ‘China taxi apps Didi Dache and Kuaidi Dache announce $6 billion tie-up’, Reuters, 14 February,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taxi-merger/china-taxi-apps-didi-dache-and-kuaidi-dache-announce-6-billion-tie-up-
idUSKBN0LI04420150214
Smout, A. (2018) ‘Put on probation, Uber wins London license to avoid ban’, Reuters, 26 June,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-britain/put-on-probation-uber-wins-london-license-to-avoid-ban-idUSKBN1JL31G
SoftBank Group Corp (2017) SoftBank Group Annual Report 2017,
https://cdn.softbank.jp/en/corp/set/data/irinfo/financials/annual_reports/pdf/2017/softbank_annual_report_2017_001.pdf
Sundararajan, A. (2016) The Sharing Economy: The End of Employment and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Tsoi, J. (2018) ‘Chinese women are hiding their faces after a ride-sharing murder’, Inkstone News, 15 May,
https://www.inkstonenews.com/society/chinese-women-change-their-profile-pictures-didi-chuxing-after-ride-sharing-
murder/article/2146136
Zhu, J. and Wu, K. (2018) ‘Didi seeks $1.5 billion car services spinoff ahead of likely IPO: sources’, Reuters, 17 July,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-didi-spinoff/didi-to-spin-off-car-services-unit-in-up-to-1-5-billion-deal-sources-idUSKBN1K705Z

The Foundation 
The mission of the Foundation is to study, reflect on,
and promote an understanding of the role that law
plays in society. This is achieved by identifying and
analysing issues of contemporary interest and
importance. In doing so, it draws on the work of
scholars and researchers, and aims to make its work
easily accessible to practitioners and professionals,
whether in government, business, or the law.
Dr Janet Hui Xue is Research Associate at the
Department of Government and International
Relations, School of Social and Political Science, The
University of Sydney.
Dr Alex Chung is Research Associate at University
College London’s Department of Science,
Technology, Engineering & Public Policy (UCL
STEaPP).
Dr Ying Yu is Research Fellow of Law, Justice and
Society at Wolfson College, and Law Faculty at
University of Oxford; coordinator of the FLJS
Consumer Rights in China Programme; and the
Research Coordinator of the RPP Project of Best
Practices of Consumer Redress for UNCTAD.
www.fljs.org
The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society
Wolfson College
Linton Road 
Oxford OX2 6UD
T   . +44 (0)1865 284433 
F  . +44 (0)1865 284434 
E  . info@fljs.org
W . www.fljs.org
For further information please visit
our website at www.fljs.org 
or contact us at:
